Since October 7, 2023, Houthi rebels in Yemen have launched more than 40 ballistic missiles and some 320 drones and cruise missiles at Israel. In the vast majority of the attacks, the missiles have been intercepted by Israeli or American air defenses, or have fallen short before reaching the country. However, a few drones and missiles have impacted their targets, causing casualties and damage. In December 2024, 16 people were wounded in a drone attack. In July, a drone killed 1 Israeli and wounded several others. Both attacks occurred in Tel Aviv, Israel’s largest city. While the Houthis always claim to be targeting some military location, it is always civilian targets that are hit.
Because of the tremendous performance of Israel’s integrated missile defense shield, Houthi attacks have been largely reduced to the category of “nuisance.” Most of the ballistic missiles are intercepted before they even enter Israeli airspace. That said, they have still caused considerable damage. The reason for this is that Israeli anti-missile systems are designed to destroy the warhead of the threat. After the destruction of the warhead, there is still a considerable amount of debris that falls to the earth, sometimes hundreds of miles from the intercept point. Recently, an empty 300-lb fuel tank from a Houthi missile fell on a house in a small town about 15 miles west of Jerusalem, embedding itself in the roof of a house. The residents escaped unharmed because they had entered a bomb shelter, as per the rules of the Home Front Command. An additional cost of the Houthi attacks stems from the Houthi strategy of firing at Israel’s densely populated midriff, consisting of Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and everything in between, a total of about 5 million people, and launching their missiles at about 2:00 a.m. The ensuing disruption to civilian life, including the psychological stress of being awakened by sirens and the need to seek shelter – on any given night, dozens of Israelis have been injured running for bomb shelters – has led to lost productivity and increased healthcare costs. In addition, many of the Houthi missiles target the southern Israeli port city of Eilat. Eilat is now, for all intents and purposes, under siege. Before October 7, all new cars shipped from Asia were delivered to the Eilat Port. Today, that port no longer functions because it is economically unfeasible to ship goods via the Persian Gulf. Goods are now shipped around the Horn of Africa, increasing time and costs. The Eilat economy has suffered immensely.
The Houthis claim to be firing on Israel in support of Hamas in Gaza. This is only partially true. The Houthis are firing on Israel because they are the southernmost Iranian proxy in the Iranian “Ring of Fire” surrounding Israel. Iran supports the Houthi rebels in Yemen through various means. Iran supplies the Houthis with weapons, including ballistic missiles, drones, and launchers. Iranian military advisors and experts assist the Houthis with training and operational planning, providing guidance on using advanced weaponry and tactics. Financial assistance from Iran helps sustain the Houthi operations and maintain their control over Western Yemen. Additionally, Iran aids in smuggling weapons and other supplies to the Houthis through complex networks that evade international sanctions and blockades. Politically, Iran offers diplomatic backing to the Houthis, advocating for their cause in international forums and providing a platform for their political messages. In return for this multifaceted Iranian support, the Houthis serve as a southern base from which to attack Israel. Yemen, while close enough to Israel to attack it with inexpensive weapons, is far enough from Israel to make reprisal raids costly and complex.
This is not to say reprisal attacks have not happened. Israel has conducted three airstrikes on Yemen since the Massacre of October 7. The first attack occurred in July 2024, targeting the Hodeidah port after a drone hit Tel Aviv. A second, more extensive, strike took place in September, targeting infrastructure in western Yemen, including ports and power plants used by the Houthis. The most recent attack occurred in December, in which the Sana’a airport and power grid were severely damaged. This last attack was carried out immediately after a smaller airstrike by the American-British coalition currently based in the Persian Gulf to protect civilian shipping lanes, indicating that Israel is operating with full coalition support. The exact number of Israel Air Force (IAF) aircraft involved in these raids has not been publicly disclosed. However, these operations typically involve a combination of fighter jets, drones, and support aircraft to ensure the success and safety of the mission, and they require extensive preparation, making return fire costly and creating a time-lag between the cause and the effect.
Continued Houthi rocket fire is, for the moment, not untenable, but it is a disaster waiting to happen. It is also an economic strain. Its effect on shipping lanes to the Far East and on Eilat is considerable. What can Israel do about it?
So far, reprisal attacks on Yemen have had no marked effect on reducing the frequency of attacks. When the ceasefire with Hamas was announced in mid-January, the Houthis publicly announced that they would be holding their fire. The ceasefire gives Israel some time to conceive a new strategy. Some assert that the next step should be to apply “maximum pressure” on Yemen by hitting its “Symbols of Sovereignty,” such as the House of Parliament, or its oil fields, or by targeted killings of its military and political leadership.
Another approach that has been suggested is to work behind the scenes to expand the American-British coalition in the Persian Gulf to additional countries such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, perhaps going so far as to create a naval siege on Yemen. The problem with this approach is that it has been tried in the past, and it has failed miserably. In 2015, Saudi Arabia imposed an air and sea blockade on Yemen that severely restricted the flow of vital commercial and humanitarian goods into the country. According to the UN World Food Programme (WFP), the blockade has created a humanitarian crisis in which hundreds of thousands of children are dying each year because of famine. Whether this is true or not is irrelevant – the optics of starving children is terrible. The Saudi blockade is still in place, and yet it has had no measurable effect on the Houthis. It will remain this way as long as the Iranians continue to airlift supplies and weapons into Yemen.
Dr. Yagil Henkin, a lecturer on military thought, history, and strategy at the IDF Command and Staff College, and a Research Associate at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies (JISS), wrote an Op-Ed on this topic in this week’s Makor Rishon, an Israeli newspaper aimed at the politically conservative and religiously observant. He posits unequivocally that Israel should not be striking back at Yemen, but, rather, at Iran. At the end of the day, the price for Houthi aggression must be paid for by the country that funded the aggression in the first place. According to this strategy, first Iran covers Houthi expenses and then it covers the mess made by the very same Houthis. Call it “paying in installments.” Henkin asserts that punishing Iran does not need to be accomplished to the sound of trumpets. Indeed, this would be counterproductive as Iran, according to its self-conceived rules of engagement, would be forced to respond. A “quiet” Israeli response could consist of attacks on Iranian shipping vessels, “accidents” at its military facilities, explosions for which no actor takes responsibility, cyber attacks on Iranian banks, sanctions against any Iranian involved in terror activity and any Iranian organization that funds terror. Henkin writes, “Yemen’s actions against Israel should lead to Iran’s life becoming more difficult, and it losing capabilities that it would have preferred to preserve. The Houthis are an Iranian proxy: it would be a mistake to respond against the envoy rather than the source.”
Attacking Iran directly, rather than Yemen, in response to Houthi aggression, could disrupt the primary source of support for the Houthis, serving as a stronger deterrent and having a more significant strategic impact. Striking Iran would send a clear message to both Iran and its proxies, potentially causing Iranian leadership to reconsider their actions. This approach targets the root of the problem, aiming to weaken Iran’s ability to project power in the region and to support proxy groups. Obviously such a move carries substantial risks, including potential escalation into a broader conflict and serious diplomatic repercussions. And of course the U.S. would have to give its blessing as its servicemen in the Persian Gulf could be put in danger from a Houthi / Iranian response. The decision to strike Iran would need to carefully weigh these benefits against the possible consequences to ensure it aligns with broader strategic goals. There is no better time than the military lull in which Israel finds itself to consider such a move.
Good things,
Ari Sacher
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