Dave (not his real name) and I go back a long time, more than 50 years. He and I see life differently: I am more conservative in my views, and he is far more liberal. We disagree on a whole lot, but both of us are ardent Zionists. Even though we live more than 10,000 kilometers away from each other, we still converse regularly. Our talks go from zero to warp speed very quickly. On Friday, we had a long conversation about the release of 4 dead hostages from Hamas terror tunnels the day before. At the time, Israel had just discovered that the body that Hamas called “Shiri Bibas” was not her body. It was the body of an unidentified Palestinian woman. Israelis were furious, as was anyone with a heart. At the time of our conversation, Hamas had not yet returned the actual body of Shiri, who they had brutally murdered about 6 weeks after they had kidnapped her. (Later that evening, Hamas returned Shiri’s body with a vague explanation that managed to say nothing other than blaming the IDF). I told Dave that we could not continue down this path any longer. If there was one thing Hamas had shown the world, it was that they are a demonic entity. This entity must be destroyed, the same way that the German Nazis were destroyed after WWII. I said that making any further concessions was not only unreasonable, it was unacceptably dangerous to Israeli security. After all, Hamas had vowed time and time again that they would carry out as many October 7s as they could. Dave asked me, “But what of the hostages? Restarting the war in Gaza would doom the rest of the living hostages.” I posited that this is not necessarily true, as the hostages are the only bargaining chip that remains in the hands of the Hamas. I countered, “Doesn’t the good of the many outweigh the good of the few?” What follows is an edited summary of a transcript of our conversation. It’s still a bit messy, but I wanted to get it out to the blogosphere before the news cycle changes:
Dave: Your question cuts to the core of a classic ethical and strategic dilemma: balancing the immediate needs of a few – the hostages and their families – against the long-term security of the many – Israel’s population, which is threatened by Hamas’s existence. Let’s break this down based on Israel’s stated primary goal of dismantling Hamas, the public’s clamor for hostage release, and the philosophical tension you’ve raised—whether the needs of the many do outweigh the needs of the few.
The first thing we need to look at is the Strategic Picture: If Israel’s overriding objective is to dismantle Hamas, then its actions should prioritize weakening the group’s military, political, and social infrastructure in Gaza. Hamas has had a reign of terror in Gaza since 2007, it launched the October 7 attack that killed 1,200 and took 251 hostages, and it has sustained a war that has killed more than 400 IDF soldiers and nearly 50,000 Palestinians (if you can believe the Gaza health officials) and devastated large swaths of the Gaza Strip. Despite the January 2025 ceasefire, Hamas retains significant leverage: it still holds another 76 hostages, about half who are believed to be alive, controls large swaths of Gaza, and it has shown surprising resilience through propaganda and negotiation tactics. Dismantling Hamas entirely means either destroying its leadership and fighters or breaking its ideological hold over the “Gazan of the Street,” which requires a viable alternative kind of governance structure, something neither Israel nor its allies have yet fully articulated.
Ari: The IDF’s degradation of Hamas’ capabilities is a critical goal. After a rough start, the IDF has taken out Hamas’ military and political leadership, people like Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Def. And the IDF has also destroyed many of their terror tunnels. That said, Hamas’ adaptability and the ceasefire’s constraints limit further progress. Prioritizing this goal suggests Israel should use the ceasefire as a tactical pause, not a permanent concession, and exploit any Hamas violation – like the Shiri Bibas incident – to justify resuming operations aimed at eradication of the organization.
Dave: The Israeli public’s loud push to “release all hostages now” reflects a visceral, human response to the ordeal, amplified by cases like the Bibas family who have become symbols of October 7’s brutality, their red hair, and helpless pleas haunting Israel’s conscience. Just count the number of orange balloons at Hostage Square in Tel Aviv since last week. The return of their bodies has fueled outrage and despair. Families and supporters argue that every day in captivity risks more deaths, especially after the IDF confirmed Ariel and Kfir Bibas were brutally murdered and not killed by airstrikes, as Hamas had claimed. Public protests show a growing sentiment that saving the remaining hostages is a moral imperative, even if it means pausing or compromising the fight against Hamas. But here’s the disconnect you’ve flagged: the hostages aren’t Israel’s to release – Hamas holds them. Israel can only negotiate, concede, or fight to retrieve them. The public’s framing indicates growing frustration with the government’s perceived inaction, as if Netanyahu’s cabinet could snap its fingers and bring them home. This ignores the reality that Hamas dictates the terms of release, as seen in the phased ceasefire deal. Every concession strengthens Hamas’ hand, potentially undermining the goal of dismantling it.
Your invocation of “the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few” evokes Spock’s utilitarian logic from the second “Star Trek ” movie, but it’s a principle rooted in real-world philosophy too. Applied here, it suggests that Israel’s 9 million citizens, who face Hamas rockets, tunnels, and ideological threat, take precedence over the remaining hostages and their families. The math is stark: securing the nation’s future by eliminating Hamas could prevent countless future deaths, while prioritizing the hostages risks prolongs the group’s existence, emboldening it to repeat October 7 as many times as it can. Historically, Israel has leaned the other way, by valuing the few. The 2011 Gilad Shalit deal saw 1,027 prisoners swapped for one soldier, including Yahya Sinwar, the mastermind of October 7. That trade saved Shalit but arguably cost lives later. The “needs of the few” resonates deeply in Jewish ethics. Pidyon Shvuyim (redeeming captives) is a core value, and it is part and parcel of Israel’s social contract, where every citizen’s life carries outsized weight in a small, tight-knit nation. The public clamor reflects this: letting the hostages die or rot in Gaza feels like abandoning the covenant that “no one gets left behind.” Yet, the strategic lens flips this. Hamas’ survival threatens the many because its charter calls for Israel’s destruction, and its actions prove intent. If Israel bends too far to free hostages now by releasing even more high-value terrorists or completely pulling the IDF out of Gaza, it might delay or even prevent dismantling Hamas, leaving the root intact to regrow. The Shiri Bibas incident, whether caused by evil or incompetence, underscores that Hamas can’t be trusted to honor deals, suggesting that concessions might not even guarantee the hostages’ safe return.
Ari: So what should Israel do? I’m willing to concede that given the primary goal of dismantling Hamas, the needs of the many should guide policy, but not dogmatically. Israel can’t ignore the hostages because their plight fuels national unity and moral legitimacy. Nevertheless, it shouldn’t let that dictate strategy at the expense of long-term security.
Dave and I thought about a what a pragmatic approach might look like, and we came up with this:
Exploit Hamas’ Violation: Use the Shiri Bibas corpse swap as leverage to suspend prisoner releases or escalate targeted strikes on Hamas assets, framing it as a response to bad faith. This pressures Hamas without fully breaking the ceasefire. (Israel did just this: After 6 living hostages were returned on Saturday, Israel refused to release 600 prisoners that it was meant to release that day).
Pursue Hostages Tactically: Intensify intelligence efforts to locate and extract more hostages, as done successfully in past rescues, rather than relying solely on negotiations that empower Hamas. This was more Dave’s idea than mine. I felt that the chances of locating additional hostages in Gaza are slim, especially after the IDF has pulled back most of their forces, severely reducing the amount of Human Intelligence (HUMINT). Even with the IDF in full force in Gaza, only 8 hostages were rescued.
Prepare the Public: Netanyahu’s government should level with citizens that dismantling Hamas may come at a cost of the lives of some of the hostages, but it’s the only way to end the cycle. Transparency could temper the “release them now” outcry by aligning it with the broader mission. We both agreed that this was the most important part of our approach.
Set a Deadline: Give Hamas a firm timeline, say 48 hours after the next scheduled release, to return all of the remaining hostages, with clear consequences – military or otherwise – if the deadline goes unmet.
The needs of the many do indeed outweigh the needs of the few in a cold, utilitarian sense – Israel’s survival trumps 76 lives in a vacuum. But in practice, the two aren’t fully separable: failing to save hostages will erode public trust, which Israel needs to sustain a war on Hamas. The trick is threading the needle, pushing to dismantle Hamas while seizing every feasible chance to free hostages, without letting the latter derail the former. Hamas thrives on this tension. Israel’s challenge is not to let it win by default.
Good things,
Ari Sacher