Over the past few weeks, this blog has been elaborating upon the background necessary to better understand Israel’s northern front – Operation Northern Arrows – against the Hezbollah as the fighting seems to be drawing toward a close. U.S. Envoy Amos Hochstein visited the region last week in a bid to broker a ceasefire. This week, we will try to understand what that ceasefire would look like, at least in broad strokes. While in the inimitable words of baseball great Yogi Berra, “It's tough to make predictions, especially about the future,” we can suggest certain components would more than likely be part of any ceasefire agreement.
The first step in any agreement is the understanding of Israel’s strategic goals, and then we can begin to understand how Israel can accomplish these goals. Israel Defense Force (IDF) officials have been quoted as stating that the primary goal of Operation Northern Arrows was to prevent an October-7-like catastrophe from occurring in Israel’s north.
For the past twenty years, Hezbollah had been building an infrastructure that would enable commando terrorists from the Radwan Brigade to cross the border en masse, likely under the cover of rocket fire as per October 7, overwhelm the IDF, capture Israeli towns, slaughter Israeli citizens, and take thousands back to Lebanon as captives and human shields. Hezbollah explicitly referred to this doomsday scenario as “Operation Conquer the Galilee.” To this end, Hezbollah had built an infrastructure of garrisons, weapons and logistic material storage facilities, rockets, and launchers. This infrastructure was located primarily underground and nearly entirely within a few miles of the border. Homes of “ordinary” Lebanese citizens served as entry points to the tunnels, facilitating access to the tunnels without the risk of being detected by Israeli reconnaissance. The tunnels were close enough to the border that a sudden assault would leave the IDF with insufficient reaction time with which to contain the assault. To preempt such a Hezbollah attack, by the early hours of October 8, the Israeli Government had evacuated all towns within 3 miles of the Lebanese border. More than 70,000 Israelis left their homes, and nearly all of them remain to this day refugees in their own country.
More than two months into the operation, this goal has largely been accomplished. Lebanese border towns have been reduced to rubble. Dozens of miles of tunnels have been blown up. Hundreds of arms caches have been discovered and destroyed. The IDF has taken the fight northward and is in the process of creating a new front line more than five miles from the border. Hezbollah no longer has the means with which to carry out a surprise attack on Israel’s north. Refugees from the Galilee can consider returning home.
The secondary goal of Operation Northern Arrows was to destroy the Hezbollah arsenal of rockets, missiles, and killer drones. According to most experts, Hezbollah began the war with more than 150,000 of these weapons. Rockets and missiles could reach every location in Israel, some of them with pinpoint accuracy, placing Israel’s critical infrastructure – power plants, desalination stations, and sea-based natural gas rigs – in clear and present danger. The IDF has been extremely successful in achieving its secondary goal. Israel Air Force (IAF) strikes since September 17 have decimated the Hezbollah arsenal, leaving, according to many accounts, about one third of what once existed. This is not an inconsiderable number, and Hezbollah has been firing one hundred or so rockets into Israel daily over the past month, showing that they still have a significant residual capability. While Israel missile defense systems such as Iron Dome and David’s sling intercept the vast majority of these threats, Hezbollah rockets are still capable of incurring damage. Most IDF officials maintain that it will be impossible to completely destroy the Hezbollah rocket arsenal because they are spread out over the entire country.
Any agreement for a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities would have to be in line with Israel’s two strategic goals: It would have to prevent Hezbollah from retaking and rebuilding the border towns that were destroyed, and it would have to prevent Hezbollah from firing rockets into Israel. The following points will also need to be accounted for in any ceasefire agreement:
The agreement will have to lie under the rubric of UN Resolution 1701 (UNR-1701). UNR-1701 has been accepted in some way or another by all sides of the conflict, even while Hezbollah has been in the process of abrogating it since it was ratified. The most critical part of UNR-1701, as far as Israel is concerned, is the disarming of all “armed personnel” between the Lebanon-Israel border (known as the Blue Line) the Litani River, which lies about twenty kilometers north of the Blue Line. Israel cannot allow any armed force to enter an area that will facilitate recapture of towns captured and destroyed by the IDF.
An agreement cannot be enforced by either the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) or by UNIFIL. The LAF is, on the one hand, beholden to Hezbollah and, on the other hand, deeply infiltrated by Hezbollah. A recent statement by a high-ranking LAF official made it clear that LAF would not stand in the way of Hezbollah were it to move forces below the Litani. UNIFIL, on the other hand, does not have the military capability to enforce any kind of treaty. Assuming that the IDF pulls out of Southern Lebanon as part of a ceasefire, security would have to be maintained by a third party. One potential way ahead would be to replace UNIFIL with an alliance of first-world nations that (1) maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, (2) have well-equipped and well-trained forces, and (3) would gain nothing from collaborating with the Hezbollah. The alliance would be tasked with ensuring that Hezbollah does not attempt to rebuild its local infrastructure. Its Rules of Engagement would enable the projection of power necessary to perform its mission, including the mandate to open fire not only in self defense and the mandate to proactively destroy any and all Hezbollah military assets below the Litani River.
Israel has an unstated end-game – the destruction of the Hezbollah. Israel has been striving to achieve this goal via the targeted killing of its political and military leadership and has been largely successful. Naim Qassem, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, who succeeded Hassan Nasrallah, the long-time Secretary-General who was killed in an Israeli Air Strike in September, is afraid to appear in public for fear that it will jeopardize his safety. He speaks only via pre-recorded speeches, and his location is known by only a handful of people. Hezbollah is now reeling. More and more Lebanese are vocally expressing their anger, accusing Hezbollah of destroying Lebanon. To complete its unstated goal, Israel requires, at minimum, two things:
Hezbollah cannot be allowed to rearm. Currently, Hezbollah receives the brunt of its weapons from Iran. Weapons are transported via air and sea to Syria and ferried over the border into Lebanon with trucks. To prevent weapons from entering Lebanon, this supply chain must be disrupted. This can be accomplished both militarily, via destruction of roads and bridges that connect Lebanon with Syria, and politically, by incentivizing authorities in Syria – both Syrian and Russian – to prevent cross-border trafficking.
To fund its social and military programs, Hezbollah requires a large amount of money. This money is primarily supplied by Iran (A not insignificant portion of Hezbollah’s income comes from drug trade in South America). Reinstatement of sanctions in Iran would have a considerable effect on all of Iran’s terror proxies, particularly Hezbollah. Without Iranian financial aid, Hezbollah would not be able to purchase weapons, build infrastructure, or train its soldiers – they would not even be able to pay their salary. They would not be able to “rent” rooms in Southern Lebanese houses to hide entrances to terror tunnels and to launch cruise missiles. While reinstatement sanctions on Iran could obviously not be a stated part of a ceasefire deal, they could be part of a background element to help cement a ceasefire.
The final point we will address is what the U.S. can do to foster a lasting ceasefire that will bring long-term security to Israelis and Lebanese. Based on the points brought forward in the previous section, the following avenues should be investigated:
UNR-1701 could be folded into congressional legislation. For instance, countries that aid and abet the breaching of UNR-1701, either financially or military, would not be eligible for American financial aid or be sold American weapons.
The U.S. could be part of an international alliance that would be responsible for enforcing UNR-1701. The U.S. Army is well-equipped and well-trained and has copious experience working in international collaboration. This task could be added to the bailiwick of CENTCOM.
The U.S. could use its relationship with Russia and Syria to encourage them to prevent arms from flowing from Syria into Lebanon. Reports that Israel has been courting Russia for this very purpose have been appearing regularly over the past two weeks. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar recently underlined the importance of this principle: “The Russians are, as you know, present in Syria. And if they are in agreement with this principle, I think they can contribute effectively to this objective.” American assistance would be invaluable.
The U.S. could apply snapback sanctions on Iran in order to impose export controls, travel bans, asset freezes, and other restrictions on individuals, entities, and banks involved in Iranian nuclear and missile activities. Snapback sanctions also include reinstating the expired UN arms embargo that barred countries from supplying, selling, or transferring most combat equipment to Iran and prohibited Iran from exporting weapons.
One last point must be made. Hezbollah, regardless of what they might state in the media, has well and truly lost this war. Southern Lebanon is uninhabitable. Beirut is being taken apart building by building, and there is nothing Hezbollah can do to stop it. Their political and military leadership has been gutted, and Israel is now targeting the replacements of the replacements. The damage that Hezbollah can incur with their rockets and missiles is limited, and most attacks are blunted by Israel’s multilayer missile defense system. Hezbollah has been vanquished, and it must be treated as such. They cannot be allowed to make more than minimal demands. They must understand that the alternative to a ceasefire is the continuation of their own destruction.
It could very well be that some or even all of the options described above are already being negotiated. According to many media outlets, a ceasefire in Southern Lebanon will be declared in only a matter of days. It is critical that if these points are not being actively negotiated, they must at least be considered as part of the gamut of constraints that color the ceasefire. This would go a long way in ensuring that the “Third Lebanon War” becomes known as the “Last Lebanon War.”
Good things,
Ari Sacher
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