Last week, we discussed a new reality in northern Israel today. Hezbollah will likely continue its death throes for months or even years. Rockets will continue to be fired on northern Israel and every so often on Tel Aviv and Ben Gurion Airport. What options does Israel have? Are we destined to spend the near foreseeable future running in and out of bomb shelters? Must the IDF conquer the entire country of Lebanon? Is this possible or even desirable? Before we begin to propose solutions, we must understand the parameters. Over the next few weeks, we will garner some background information that will instruct our ability to make decisions.
One of the most important parameters in the equation is the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), which will have a vital role to play once the IDF withdraws from Lebanon, assuming that it does not plan on retaining forces across the border. Any treaty or agreement with Lebanon will require a security entity to supplant the Hezbollah, which will either be banished north of the Litani River or dismantled completely. This entity will more than likely be based on the LAF. In order to understand the structure and the mission of the LAF, as well as the difficulties it faces in performing its mission, some geopolitical background is necessary.
Lebanon is made up of a collage of three religions: Maronite Christians, Sunni Moslems, and Shiite Moslems, with each religion making up more or less one third of the total population. In general, the Christians live in the western part of the country. The Sunnis live in the north and the southeast. The Shiites live in the south, on the border with Israel, and in the northeast in the Beqaa Valley. There is no love lost between the three religions.
Between 1975-1990, Lebanon was torn by a Civil War in which more than 150,000 people were killed. Since the end of the war, Lebanon has essentially spiraled into a failed state. Lebanon is more of a patchwork quilt than a coherent country. This makes governing the country extremely difficult. The central government is frail at best and non-existent at worst. Lebanon has not had a President since 2022. Lebanon’s political system is based on sectarian quotas, which complicates the election process: The president must be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shia Muslim. The parliament is similarly based on sectarian quotas, resulting in a body that is deeply divided among various political factions, including pro- and anti-Hezbollah groups. The parliament has become so dysfunctional to the point that it simply cannot govern, meaning that day-to-day governance has become the job of the local authorities. This arrangement has become a source of power for Hezbollah, as they, and not the government, have been providing for the welfare of the South-Lebanese for more than a generation. They provide the civilian population schooling, food, and healthcare, all largely funded by Iran.
It is only natural that a failed state should have a failed army. The primary source of the LAF’s problems is economics. The LAF lacks resources, both financial and military, to act as a functioning army. Salaries are too low to entice people to enlist. The budget is too small to purchase military equipment that would enable it to conduct operations, maintain its equipment, and train its soldiers. As a result, the LAF proves no match militarily for non-state actors such as Hezbollah. Another result of the Lebanese Civil War is the change in the demographics of the LAF over the past twenty years. While Christians were once heavily represented in the army, particularly among commanders and officers, Shiites now hold a strong majority. Hezbollah has a clear interest in the growth of Shiite personnel in the Lebanese armed forces, who are likely to support and identify with Hezbollah. The rise of Shi’ism, combined with the fall in Christian recruiting, has played an important role in strengthening the Lebanese army’s links with Hezbollah. It is unsurprising that LAF orientation manuals teach new recruits that “support for the resistance” (i.e., Hezbollah) is “a legitimate right for the Lebanese.”
Entanglement with Hezbollah has had a tangible effect on the role of the LAF in Southern Lebanon, especially as it pertains to controlling the border with Israel:
The line separating Hezbollah from the LAF is fine, indeed. On one hand, Hezbollah recruits LAF army commanders, enabling coordination with the LAF while turning it into an arm of the Hezbollah. Hezbollah has built watchtowers on the Israel border under the guise of them being LAF watchtowers. The IDF have verified that these watchtowers were operated by Hezbollah personnel. On the other hand, Hezbollah has infiltrated the ranks of the LAF, giving Hezbollah access to western weaponry and technology. In this way, Hezbollah gained access to security radars at Beirut International Airport and the Lebanese Navy, curtailing the freedom of movement of the IDF.
Not only has Hezbollah infiltrated the LAF, they have also infiltrated the governmental security system. Until recently, the role of Chief of General Security was designated to a Maronite Christian, but Hezbollah successfully petitioned to have it redesignated to a Shiite. Hezbollah relies heavily on general security intelligence, as well as counterintelligence to prevent infiltration of spies.
Just as Hezbollah manipulates the Southern Lebanese with financial aid, it also manipulates LAF soldiers and officers, attracting non-Shiite officers and soldiers to its cause. Hezbollah appeals to all soldiers from diverse communities who are in dire economic situations by offering “economic assistance” and receiving benefits in return.
Past efforts to enforce UN resolutions in Southern Lebanon, such as Resolution 1701, which calls for the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon, have not been implemented. Hezbollah has continued its activities in southern Lebanon, often with the LAF turning a blind eye. Given the amount of overlap between the LAF and the Hezbollah, this should not be surprising. Given the analysis presented here, it is unlikely that the LAF can enforce a new political outline in southern Lebanon or serve as an effective counterbalance to Hezbollah under the current circumstances. Any plan for “The Day After” in Southern Lebanon must take this into consideration.
For the LAF to effectively control Lebanon and disentangle from Hezbollah, several key changes and improvements are necessary:
Increased Funding and Resources: The LAF needs substantial financial support to improve its operational capabilities. This includes better salaries for soldiers, modern equipment, and sufficient supplies.
International Support: Enhanced international assistance, particularly from European countries and the United States, is crucial. This support should include training, advanced military hardware, and logistical aid.
Political Will and Reform: The Lebanese government must demonstrate a strong political will to empower the LAF. This includes implementing reforms to reduce corruption and ensure that the military operates independently of sectarian influences.
Strategic Partnerships: Forming strategic partnerships with international forces, such as the US Central Command (CENTCOM) can help the LAF in maintaining security and stability, especially in volatile regions like southern Lebanon.
These steps, if implemented effectively, could significantly enhance the LAF’s ability to control Lebanon and maintain stability in the long term as part of a peace agreement with Israel.
Next week we’ll look at how the United Nations (UN) fits into the equation.
Good Things,
Ari Sacher
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