Gaza End Game

On March 18, 2025, Israel renewed its war against Hamas, calling it “Operation Might and Sword.” The IDF have resumed bombarding targets, assassinating key Hamas military and political figures, and, most importantly, have begun capturing territory to be used as a buffer zone. Hamas’s response is muted. It has launched a few of its remaining weapons. On April 19, for the first time, Hamas launched an offensive operation against the IDF, killing one soldier and injuring five. For the most part, Hamas seems satisfied in simply staying alive. 

This poses a problem. Thoroughly defeating Hamas, as per the Israeli government’s definition of destroying its administrative and military capability, will take years. The past 18 months have shown that Hamas will not surrender, whatever the cost to themselves and to anyone else who happens to be in the vicinity. This kind of victory requires going through Gaza with a fine-toothed comb, moving large amounts of civilians, capturing more territory, just in order to locate Hamas operatives. The greatest issue is not the time requirements, but, rather, the manpower requirements. The bulk of the IDF consists of reservists, many of whom have served more than 300 days since October 7. Taking over large swaths of Gaza will pose an impossible burden on the reservists. Businesses are already failing, families are falling apart, and there is no end in sight. People I know – dedicated idealistic people – are negotiating with their Commanding Officers to halve the amount of time they must spend in their next stint of reserve duty. My son, a Platoon Commander, will start a 70-day stint this fall. He has no idea how many of his soldiers will show up, and he cannot blame them. How, then, should Israel proceed in its war to defeat Hamas?

Here is one way. On March 25, protests erupted in Beit Lahia, northern Gaza, a heavily devastated area, following Israeli evacuation orders and renewed airstrikes. Videos showed hundreds of mostly young men marching, chanting “Out, out, out, Hamas out” and “Hamas terrorists.” The protests have continued, with a significant demonstration on April 4, where women and children joined for the first time, marking a notable escalation in public dissent. The protests centered on three main demands: an end to the war, improved living conditions (access to food, water, and shelter), and for Hamas to step down from power. By April 16, posts on X reported a turning point: protesters in northern Gaza confronted Hamas members attempting to infiltrate demonstrations with pro-Hamas banners, tearing them down and expelling the infiltrators. Some Gazans even began physically intercepting Hamas fighters attempting to fire rockets, a significant escalation in direct opposition. Hamas’ response to the demonstrations, while initially forceful, have petered down. The lack of Hamas crackdowns after the initial violence suggests their weakened state and also, potentially, a way to end the war – if Israel plays her cards right.

Precedents for this path are not lacking. The Green Revolution in Iran erupted in June 2009 after a disputed presidential election where Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared the winner over reformist Mir-Hossein Mousavi. Allegations of fraud sparked massive protests, with millions demanding a recount and political reform, adopting green as their symbol. The government responded with violence, killing 150 protesters, arresting over 4,000, and censoring the media. Key figures were placed under house arrest. President Obama chose not to support the revolution, preferring to negotiate a settlement to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, a settlement that leaves Iran a matter of days from a nuclear weapon. In a podcast in 2022, Obama expressed a certain amount of regret: “In retrospect, I think that was a mistake. Every time we see a flash, a glimmer of hope, of people longing for freedom, I think we have to point it out. We have to shine a spotlight on it. We have to express some solidarity about it.”  Had the U.S. supported the Green Revolution, perhaps the Iranians would have overthrown the Mullahs along with the threat of a nuclear Iran.

On November 27, 2024, Israel and Hezbollah entered into a cease fire. While many, including myself, were initially skeptical of the holding power of the cease fire, not only does it seem to be holding, but Hezbollah as a military organization seems to be in a death spiral. Its war-stock of missiles and rockets is dwindling, and its ability to rearm has been curtailed due to the overthrow of the Baath regime in Syria. But what is most negatively impacting Hezbollah are the Lebanese people. Hezbollah, while a non-state actor, is the administrative and military wing of the Lebanese Shiites, representing about one third of the country. The other two thirds of the country have turned on Hezbollah, blaming them for dragging Lebanon into a war that caused the country immense damage. Hezbollah has lost most of its power in the Lebanese Parliament. A new President, Joseph Aoun, has been elected, and is doing all in his power to diminish Hezbollah’s power. The Lebanese Army (LAF) has taken ownership over Lebanese security, preventing Hezbollah from firing rockets into Israel and stripping them of their arms. Hezbollah is now openly talking about the option of shutting its military wing and concentrating on local politics. Throughout Lebanon, Hezbollah members are being shunned. Posters of the Hezbollah flag and of its former ruler, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, that adorned the road to the Beirut Airport, have been taken down. The Lebanese People have had enough.

The question remains: Is it possible to leverage the anti-Hamas sentiment in Gaza to oust Hamas the same way that Lebanon is ousting – or at least defanging – Hezbollah? Can we learn from the mistakes made by the Obama Administration? The idea of Israel organizing and supporting anti-Hamas protests in Gaza to weaken or topple Hamas is a complex and sensitive proposition, drawing loose parallels to the U.S.’s cautious approach during Iran’s Green Revolution and Lebanon’s recent success in curbing Hezbollah’s influence post-ceasefire. To proceed, a few problems would need to be addressed:

1. In Gaza, there is no viable alternative to Hamas. Lebanon’s LAF and President Aoun provided a framework to curb Hezbollah; Gaza’s Palestinian Authority or local clans lack similar clout. Iran’s Green Movement failed without security control; Gaza’s protesters face worse odds against Hamas’s fighters.

2. There is no charismatic figure that could lead, or at least galvanize, the Gazans. Gaza’s tribes can mediate but lack a unifying leader; activists are silenced; ex-Fatah like Mohammad Dahlan are tainted – Gazans think that the PA is in Israeli control while Israel does not trust the PA. Unlike Lebanon’s Aoun or Iran’s Mousavi, no Gazan has the stature or freedom to lead a coalition.

Assuming that an alternative to Hamas could be found, how could that alternative be nurtured? Direct Israeli rhetoric would discredit protesters. Any Israeli endorsement could be a “kiss of death” that risks labeling protesters as “Zionist collaborators,” a charge already leveled in Gaza in March. Lebanon’s LAF succeeded by avoiding Israeli branding. The U.S. would suffer from similar negative branding.  A potential way ahead lies in Egypt. Egypt is already accepted by all parties as a fair negotiator. Add to this the fact that Egypt is as interested in defanging Hamas as Israel, as Hamas is a kindred spirit to the Moslem Brotherhood that threatens President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s rule. Egypt could leverage its influence as a mediator and border controller to empower an alternative to Hamas. Egypt has another reason to play ball – it is one of the world’s biggest recipients of U.S. military aid. 

Here is how this could play out: Egypt could quietly identify and promote a neutral Gazan figure – a tribal sheikh, activist, or ex-Fatah moderate – as a coalition leader, using its mediation channels to legitimize them. Egypt could then broker a “Gaza Unity Council” of tribal, activist, and ex-Fatah figures to challenge Hamas politically. Alternatively, Egypt could open the Rafah crossing (with Israeli permission) to channel aid, such as food, medicine, rebuilding funds through tribal or civil society groups, bypassing Hamas’s monopoly and taking away one of its primary sources of income. 

Admittedly, the odds are not good. Unlike Israel, Egypt’s Arab and mediator status avoids the “kiss of death.” Hamas’s 15,000 fighters – and they have put out want ads for another 35,000 – combined with Gaza’s siege and the lack of a clear leader on the horizon limit the chances of success. Lebanon’s 2025 LAF-led gains show state power works; Gaza’s tribes lack this, and Egypt’s caution – prioritizing stability over upheaval – could cap its role. Nevertheless, the idea bears further scrutiny. If back-channel discussions are not already taking place in Cairo, they should be.

Good things,

Ari Sacher